Monday, April 12, 2021

Left Activist Groups Are Paper Tigers

The formula for political success is simple. Do popular things and don't do, and ideally dissociate yourself from, unpopular things. The Democrats have been doing well at the first but they are still having trouble with the second.
Why is this? One reason is fear. Democratic politicians fear the wrath of activist groups if they dissociate themselves too directly from causes dear to the hearts of activist groups even if these causes are widely unpopular with actual voters. The reasoning is presumably that these activist groups represent important constituencies whose views have to be attended to lest they turn against the Democrats or become demoralized and fail to turn out.
But there is a simple solution to this problem that would give the Democrats a lot more freedom to adopt optimal political positions. Ignore the activist groups--or at least most of them. The fact of the matter is that these groups are typically quite unrepresentative of the constituencies they purport to represent. Therefore the threat that these groups will denounce politicians who fail to accord their unpopular policy ideas due respect is empty and can safely be discarded.
Matt Yglesias points out a good example of this in the context of the New York mayoral race, where Andrew Yang is doing quite well despite being the target of a number of activist groups.
"Yang versus the activists....reveals — and not for the first time — that progressive identity-oriented activist organizations often have very little connection to the groups they purport to represent. You can listen to these groups if you want to. But if your purpose in listening to them is to understand how certain communities are thinking about specific issues, you’re barking up the wrong tree....
Of course, groups that are not representative could nonetheless be influential in delivering the votes of the constituencies that they claim to represent.
But something we keep seeing is that this is not the case. For a good case study here, I strongly recommend Astead Herndon’s February 2020 article “Elizabeth Warren Has Won Black Activists. She’s Losing the Black Vote.”
There’s no politician in America who’s more closely aligned with what Skocpol calls “the non-profit industrial complex” than Warren. This cluster of progressive groups is not exactly “the establishment” (in the sense of lobbyists, revolving door types, etc.), but like Warren herself, they were sufficiently embedded enough in establishment politics that they didn’t want to back a longshot rogue operation like Bernie Sanders’ 2016 campaign. Then the Warren 2020 campaign was supposed to be the moment of triumph for this bridging sector of Democratic politics — displacing the establishment with a counter-establishment of academics, think-tankers, and activists.
And it worked very well at winning Warren the loyalty of (mostly white) college-educated liberals. But it also worked well at securing Warren a kind of rainbow coalition of college-educated liberal activists of many ethnicities. It’s just that Warren-endorsing groups like Black Womxn For turn out to neither reflect the views of Black women nor be influential in shaping the views of Black women. Most African American voters turned out to be moderate, electability-minded Biden supporters, and those who were not turned out to be mostly younger, anti-establishment Bernie supporters.
Julián Castro, after a successful career in San Antonio politics and the Obama cabinet as a fairly mainstream Democrat, decided for some reason to run a very Warren-esque presidential campaign, and for his trouble ended up flopping massively with Hispanic voters. This is a younger group than African Americans, so it was a Sanders demographic in the primary, but then (famously) a decent slice of conservative-minded Latinos defected to Trump in 2020.
Andrew Yang, similarly, has become the frontrunner in the New York City mayoral election, not despite criticism from activist groups, but precisely because he has adopted normal popular opinions like “groups suffering from rising crime need more police protection.”.....
[W]hat’s striking about Yang is how effortlessly the combination of “he’s well-known” and “he avoids toxically unpopular left-wing ideas” has let him leapfrog past people like Scott Stringer and Maya Wiley who’ve spent years (if not decades) trying to climb the greasy pole of progressive niche politics.
And the thing about this is we are talking about a primary election in New York City, not a statewide race in Pennsylvania or North Carolina or Florida. If this style of politics doesn’t have purchase there, where does it have purchase?
The answer, I think, is it serves as a cudgel that works internally in fairly elite progressive spaces.
One reason is that white progressives now operate in the context of a set of deference norms that lead them to seek out questionably representative activist groups as powerful bludgeons. Instead of one white progressive agreeing to disagree with another white progressive, the winning move is to find some activist entity that agrees with you and use that to say that the other person has an obligation to shut up. Here’s what Indivisible’s national leaders told their local members last fall about why they had to stick with the slogan “defund the police” rather than adopting some more palatable message:
"Why say “defund” instead of [insert option here]? We hear you. During such a contentious time in our history, it might seem like we should be prioritizing strategic language at every turn. The thing is, allyship is about listening to the people who are most profoundly affected and taking their position seriously. Defunding the police comes from Black and brown grassroots organizations, like Movement for Black Lives’s (M4BL), who are rightfully at the forefront of this fight for justice. The #DefundHate Coalition, spearheaded by immigration rights organizations at United We Dream and Detention Watch Network, relates their own mission to cutting funding for ICE and CBP to defunding the police in solidarity with Black lives. As a white-led organization, it is not Indivisible’s place to make suggestions about how Black and brown activists are expressing their demands. We want to participate in the conversation, but it’s not our place to reframe it to be more palatable to the masses to people of color’s lived experiences."...
[T]here is an important similarity between Yang and Trump, namely that Trump ran in 2016 by blowing off elite conservative attachment to free trade and “entitlement reform” to deliver a brand of politics that was better at catering to the base and also won over some swing voters. The key insight they share is that even in today’s polarized world, normal people are more polarized on affect toward the other party than they are on specific policy issues. So there’s an easy opportunity for “outsider” figures who are well-known to sort of waltz in, brush off the activists, and appeal to normal people.
What’s interesting to me is that so far, you don’t see very many career politicians copying that approach. At a certain level of politics that makes sense. To get from local office to statewide office, being well-liked by elite co-partisans is very, very helpful. But I think Castro would have done much better in 2016 if he’d run as “like Joe Biden, a former member of the Obama administration, but young and energetic and Hispanic.” And I think it’s odd that Kamala Harris doesn’t try harder to do some populist stuff around immigrant patriotism or a little light mockery of the most laughable Bay Area progressives. Once you reach a certain level in the game, the activists don’t have any more power over you, and in fact fighting with them can be a good way to elevate your profile and emphasize your popular ideas."
Promote popular ideas, dissociate yourself from unpopular ones. Once you remember most activist groups are paper tigers, this all becomes much easier to do.

Saturday, April 10, 2021

"Defund the Police" Was a Terrible Idea and Worse Slogan, Part a Zillion

 From a new Vox/Data for Progress poll:

May be an image of text that says '[5] Do you think regular police patrols Response Topline Democrat Less safe your neighborhood would make you feel less safe or more safe? Independent/Third Party 14 More safe 21 Repub- lican Under 45 77 45+ Don't know 14 71 Black African American 7 9 28 76 6 Weighted N 8 Hispanic or Latino/a 85 White 63 1209 26 85 10 456 8 22 9 10 65 9 334 418 70 81 9 441 768 8 9 138 103 893'

David Brooks, Liberal Patriot

Say what you will about David Brooks, he writes some good columns sometimes. This is one of the good ones, where he channels his inner Liberal Patriot. I find little to disagree with here.
"The early days of the Biden administration are nothing if not a daring leap....Some people say this is like the New Deal. I’d say this is an updated, monster-size version of “the American System,” the 19th-century education and infrastructure investments inspired by Alexander Hamilton, championed by Henry Clay and then advanced by the early Republicans, like Abraham Lincoln. That was an unabashedly nationalist project, made by a youthful country, using an energetic government to secure two great goals: economic dynamism and national unity.
Bidenomics is a massive bid to promote economic dynamism. It’s not only the R&D spending and the green energy stuff; it’s also the massive investment in kids and human capital.
If, as expected, Biden’s American Family Plan includes universal pre-K education and free community college, that would mean four more years of free schooling for millions of young Americans. As Rahm Emanuel said to me, when was the last time we achieved something as big as that?
It’s also a unifying agenda. For the past several decades the economy has funneled money to highly educated people who live in large metro areas. That has created a ruinous class rift that divides the country and fuels polarization. The Biden measures would funnel money to the roughly two-thirds of Americans without a bachelor’s degree — who work on road crews, in manufacturing plants, who care for the elderly and are disproportionately unemployed."
That's an excellent way to look at Bidenomics. Good for Brooks to get this and say this. Also, the article I wrote with Peter Juul for American Affairs has some similar themes and might be worth a look if you are intrigued by Brooks' column.

Friday, April 9, 2021

How Moderate Democrats Can Take Advantage of a Republican Coalition in Crisis

Andy Levison at The Democratic Strategist takes a look at the latest Democracy Corps memo on "What Will Trump Loyalists’ Sensed Powerlessness Mean For Politics?"and considers how moderate Democrats can leverage the situation to improve Democratic prospects. Important stuff. As I have frequently noted, the ostentatiously progressive Democrats get the ink but the Democrats' near-term fate depends much more on how moderate Democrats fare in coming elections.
"While it is almost impossible for many Democrats to seriously imagine that any white Americans could be genuinely afraid of this result, there is no question that it is felt by many white Republicans with complete sincerity. While Democrats envision a progressive future America as being an exciting, culturally and ethnically diverse, multiracial country in which there is general tolerance for diversity, white working class and small town people imagine an elitist society in which they have no place. To understand how this vision can seem entirely plausible, one has only to consider how rarely small town life or manual labor are portrayed positively in TV commercials and other media as part of the golden future that lies ahead. In slick advertisements and magazine spreads “the future” always looks like a world of gleaming office towers, bright young people in bustling urban centers and “country” as a place that people drive to in late model SUVs in order to go rock climbing or mountain biking.
The political implication of this is that moderate Democrats in Red State districts must very sincerely reassure Republicans that they genuinely value and respect the America of small towns, manual labor and the cultural traditions of that world and do not think it all an obsolete relic that should disappear. Moderate Democrats must make clear that the Democratic vision is for mutual tolerance and respect for different kinds of communities and not the ascendency of one group or community over another.
A related fact that emerges from the research is that many Republicans are seriously and deeply disturbed by what seems to them a Democratic indifference and even tolerance for social chaos. This extends across a wide range of social problems – from crime to urban decay to homeless vagabonds, illegal immigrants and failing schools. For Republicans, the common thread in all these problems is a Democratic failure to insist that rules should be followed and law and order firmly upheld.
The most powerful issue in 2020 was the specter of urban riots whose importance the GOP vastly exaggerated until many Republicans were sincerely convinced that it was totally out of control….Democrats must draw a clear line regarding what they view as genuinely unacceptable violations of social order. Among progressives there is tendency to resist endorsing slogans like “law and order” because they can sound like coded appeals to racial prejudice. But carried to an extreme this is profoundly counterproductive. Democratic voters do not actually support rioting of the type in which the Antifa protesters engaged in last year or passively accept street crime and other urban lawlessness. Democrats can be tough on riots and crime and actually win support from African-Americans and Latinos who drifted notably toward the Republicans in significant measure because in 2020 they also fear and reject chaos as much as whites….
Moderate Democrats will also have the opportunity to make inroads into the 30% who are somewhat or strongly opposed to him.
The Democracy Corps report says the following about this group: About 30 percent of Republicans are [either] non-Trump conservatives [or] the ideologically and religiously moderate —with the latter forming half of this bloc that vocally opposes Trump. …they are now much clearer where they differ with Trump and much more willing to express it, even in a room full of Trump loyalists. Trump’s CPAC speech — “that’s what I hate” says one. They called out the “nut jobs” and conspiracy theorists. They don’t understand their fellow Republican’s opposition to masks and health measures. They don’t think the 2nd Amendment is sacred, oppose the display of weapons in Michigan, and want to regulate guns. When others said they appreciated what the Proud Boys did, they called them out as “not patriots.” They seemed open to a much more expansive role for government.
This is encouraging but it should not lead to misperceiving them as fully in agreement with moderates or liberals:
They do share with other Republicans an aversion to BLM and cancel culture; they too are looking for more law and order and seem uncomfortable with whites being on the defensive. They agreed that the elite media ignored the violence in the cities.
What this clearly indicates is that the same tactics that can reassure or partially neutralize the opposition of the Trump loyalists can also present an attractive alternative for these voters….
[M]oderate Democrats must recognize that they have to pre-empt the inevitable Republican distortions of their views by very clearly drawing certain “lines in the sand” about their firm opposition to rioting, crime, and allowing demands for “political correctness” to essentially require that average Americans completely adopt the language and culture of the university or face censure, contempt and condemnation.
A position of this kind will not only resonate with the 30% of non-Trumpist Republicans but will also “lower the temperature” of the Trumpist Republicans themselves and convince them that the elections of 2022 and 2024 are not apocalyptic battles against evil in which the future itself is literally at stake. To the extent that this can be achieved, it will reduce the turnout of low frequency GOP voters and enhance the likelihood of Democratic victories."
Read all of Levison's analysis and the original DCorps memo at the links below.
THEDEMOCRATICSTRATEGIST.ORG
thedemocraticstrategist.org

Thursday, April 8, 2021

It Was Hispanic Women Wot Done It

The Democrats hemorrhaged Hispanic votes in 2020. Initial hot takes tended to elevate shifts among HIspanic men above shifts among Hispanic women (Hispanic men liked Trump's macho persona, etc). This turns out to have been completely wrong. Pretty much all the most serious data analyses of the Hispanic vote in 2020 vote have found that the shift among Hispanic women was much larger than the shift among Hispanic men. Eric Levitz on the New York magazine site reports on one of these analyses, a slide show released by Equis Research. Levitz does a nice job of summarizing the more interesting findings from the slides and putting them in context, one of which is shown below, with shifts among Hispanic women far outpacing those among Hispanic men.
The Equis data also confirm the now widely-understood story that the pro-Trump shifts weren't confined to south Florida and Texas, but instead were all over the country.
The debate continues on the precise breakdown of pro-Trump shifts between defections and new voters who showed up and voted for Trump. As it does on the relative roles of pro-Trump views on the economy and the activation of social conservatism by increasing Democratic liberalism on race and other issues.
The Equis people seem determined to preserve immigration as an uncomplicatedly positive issue for Democrats among these voters, suggesting the only problem was lack of salience in 2020. I'm not so sure about this.
Kevin Drum suggests a different interpretation of how the immigration issue has evolved among Hispanic voters (see chart below):
"Roughly speaking, I think Trump suckered Democrats into becoming extremists on border policy. It's fine for Democrats to oppose the wall—most Hispanics oppose it too—but progressives, goaded by Trump, have staked out a position that's often only a finger's width away from not having any border security at all. And that's something that most Hispanics don't support.
To put it simply, Hispanics are like the rest of us: They care about other people, but they care about themselves more. When it comes to immigrants who are already in the country, legally or not, they're in favor of giving them a road to citizenship. But they're not especially keen on allowing lots of new immigrants in who will compete with them for jobs and housing. Trump may be a buffoon, but at least some Hispanics have decided that they can put up with that if the alternative is risking a big increase in the rate of illegal immigration.
Added to that, of course, is the well-known fact that many Hispanics are fundamentally conservative to begin with: Family oriented, religious, against abortion, in favor of low taxes, opposed to defunding the police, etc. It's been common knowledge forever that Republicans could win a big share of the Hispanic vote if they'd just moderate their base, but it turns out there's another way: Get the Democrats to radicalize their base instead. It seems to have worked."
Other interpretations of the immigration issue and the shifts are retailed in the Levitz piece. Read it and see what you think. I continue to find David Shor's interpretation most persuasive (also from the Levitz article):
"In an interview with Intelligencer last month, Democratic data scientist David Shor outlined one account of the 2020 results. His story goes like this: Democrats have long relied on the backing of Hispanic voters who self-identify as “conservative.” Such conservatives often have left-of-center views on economic policy, but lean right on issues of crime and policing. In 2020, Hispanic conservatives began voting more like white ones, and this was especially true of those who espoused the most right-wing views on “law and order” in policy polls. Therefore, Shor surmises that the heightened salience of policing issues following the George Floyd protests — and the Democratic Party’s association with “defund the police” in some media coverage of those protests — played a major role in driving Hispanic defections....
David Shor told me that he has observed the same trend in his own data. And he argues that the concentration of Trump’s gains among Latinas is consistent with his hypothesis that “defund the police” influenced Hispanic voting behavior since, in his polling, women rank crime as a more important issue than men do.....
Shor has long encouraged Democrats to do everything in their power to heighten the salience of the party’s most popular economic positions, while reducing the electoral relevance of immigration. This advice is grounded in a concern with the party’s steadily eroding support among non-college-educated white voters, who often lean left on matters of economics but right on those of borders. He often notes that in 2012, when Barack Obama and Mitt Romney framed their race as a referendum on whether the wealthy had “built” all they owned, the Democrat won 60 percent of the “pro–universal health care, anti-amnesty for the undocumented” vote. Four years later, when Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both centered their messaging on conceptions of American identity — with the former championing multicultural diversity (“stronger together”), and the latter, white ethno-nationalism — the Democratic nominee’s support from pro-socialized medicine, anti-amnesty voters dropped by 19 points. Since Americans of this ideological bent are overrepresented in Rust Belt battlegrounds, that decline was sufficient to cost Clinton the presidency."
The story will continue to be debated as it should. But I think everyone can (or should) agree the Democrats have a very, very big problem here.


How Can We Build a New Liberal Narrative?

Peter Juul and Brian Katulis tackle this hugely important question at The Liberal Patriot.
"As we’ve written before here at The Liberal Patriot, the center-left needs a new intellectual infrastructure to better disseminate its core principles and resist illiberal politics from all quarters. An important part of that effort involves building new sources of support that can yoke practical policies to broader principles. In other words, liberals need a new set of institutions, programs, and individuals that can tell a compelling story about their principles, politics, and policies.
Right now, however, this narrative infrastructure doesn’t exist – and it shows. The Biden administration has gotten off to a strong start on a number of fronts, from pandemic relief and economic rebuilding to pragmatic foreign policy decisions. But it’s struggled to tie its actions together in a coherent story that it can tell the American people and the world....
This lack of a convincing center-left story results from a variety of causes, but it’s fundamentally rooted in the much broader collapse of liberal intellectual infrastructure in recent decades.
This collapse has 4 components:
1. Outsourcing narrative-building to academics, activists, and political journalists.
After the tumult of the 1960s, liberals in and around the Democratic Party outsourced the vital task of narrative-building to a random assortment of activists, academics, and political journalists. Anti-war activists, for instance, issue empty calls to “end endless wars,” while unpopular and unwise proposals to defund the police originated with small, unrepresentative far-left activist groups. When these parties are interested in constructing narratives, they’re likely to tell bleak and pessimistic stories about America itself – such as the factually-challenged 1619 Project published and heavily promoted by the New York Times. For their part, many politically-minded academics have spent the past many decades conjuring up what the late philosopher Richard Rorty called “dreams not of political reforms but of inexplicable, magical transformations” of a fundamentally corrupt society in thrall to mystical “preternatural forces.” To be clear, voices from a diverse range of experts and activists should be part of the mix when it comes to building an inclusive nationalism. But to succeed in building a narrative, the North Star should be about painting a hopeful vision of the future, rather than getting stuck in the current moment or wallowing in the past."
Plus they cover three more:
2. Positioning through polling rather than staking out clear positions based on ideas and values linked to a story
3. The rise of the technocratic and bureaucratic wonks.
4. The quest for echo chambers.
Read it all at The Liberal Patriot!

Wednesday, April 7, 2021

How the Democrats Can Win in 2022: It Will Take Some Things the Democrats Want To Do and Some Things They Don’t Want To Do

My latest at The Liberal Patriot.
"Let’s stipulate two things about 2022. One, it will be difficult for the Democrats *not* to lose control of Congress and two, it is very important that they *don’t* lose control of Congress."
I explain both things in the post and suggest how the Democrats might be able to negotiate these challenges. Read the whole thing at The Liberal Patriot!