Friday, August 11, 2017

Are Democrats United?


Yeah, pretty much. Sure there's some ongoing tension between erstwhile Sanders supporters and erstwhile Clinton supporters, but really it doesn't amount to much despite the occasional heavy-breathing newspaper article. Compare to the knife fights we regularly see in the Republican party. It's not even close.

That doesn't mean of course that there isn't debate within the party on how to best move Democratic priorities forward. That's as it should be. But what Democrats shouldn't have is aggressive litmus tests on which exact policy Democrats must support to embody those priorities. That would be one way current Democratic unity really could start going south.

Paul Krugman had some useful thoughts along these lines in a recent column. 

Krugman argues:
Some even want to make support for single-payer a litmus test for Democratic candidates....A commitment to universal health coverage — bringing in the people currently falling through Obamacare’s cracks — should definitely be a litmus test. But single-payer, while it has many virtues, isn’t the only way to get there; it would be much harder politically than its advocates acknowledge; and there are more important priorities.....
I’d enhance the A.C.A., not replace it, although I would strongly support reintroducing some form of public option — a way for people to buy into public insurance — that could eventually lead to single-payer.
Meanwhile, progressives should move beyond health care and focus on other holes in the U.S. safety net...When you compare the U.S. social welfare system with those of other wealthy countries, what really stands out now is our neglect of children. Other countries provide new parents with extensive paid leave, provide high-quality, subsidized day care for children with working parents and make pre-K available to everyone or almost everyone; we do none of these things. Our spending on families is a third of the advanced-country average, putting us down there with Mexico and Turkey.
So if it were up to me, I’d talk about improving the A.C.A., not ripping it up and starting over, while opening up a new progressive front on child care.
I completely agree with Krugman on the desirability of taking on the child care issue in a big way. And speaking of improving the ACA, Gerard Anderson, Jacob Hacker and Paul Starr have an excellent piece in Health Affairs on "Making the Exchanges More Competitive by Bringing Medicare into the Fold". Well worth reading and another demonstration that there are many ways, not just one way, to further the goal of universal health coverage.

So let the debates continue. But Democrats should skip the litmus tests stuff. Leave that to the Republicans and their ongoing civil war.

Thursday, August 10, 2017

Trump Fades in the Rust Belt

Gallup data show Trump's approval fading, including in key Rust Belt states:


These data, based on 80,000 interviews by Gallup this year through the end of June, show that significant damage is being done to Trump's support in key Rust Belt and other states the GOP needs to carry to be successful in 2020. 

Ron Brownstein has a good analysis of these data in his latest CNN column. He notes:
On one front, Trump faces undiminished resistance from minority voters, who opposed him in preponderant numbers last year. On the second, he is confronting a consistent -- and, in many states, precipitous -- decline in support from white-collar white voters, who expressed much more skepticism about him last fall than GOP presidential candidates usually face. From the third direction, Trump's support among working-class whites, while still robust, is receding from its historically elevated peak back toward a level more typical for Republican presidential candidates -- especially in the pivotal Rust Belt states that sealed his victory….
[T]hese poll results challenge the conclusion that Trump's political base has remained impregnable across the traditionally decisive swing states in presidential politics -- as well as several other states that each side hopes to put into play by 2020. "The implications going forward are fairly problematic," says long-time Republican pollster Glen Bolger. "He doesn't have a lot of room to drop, and yet he is."…
Trump is confronting approval ratings well below 50% in [some] states with marquee Senate races -- including Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Florida (where Democrats are attempting to hold seats) as well as Nevada and Arizona (where Republican incumbents could face their most serious challenges.)…
[I]n the Gallup results, Trump's approval rating among college-educated whites has declined relative to his 2016 vote in all 13 states. In seven of those states, his approval rating stands at least 10 points lower than his vote --a list topped by North Carolina and Florida (both 19 points lower), Georgia (18 points lower), Ohio (15 points), Virginia (12 points), and Michigan and Minnesota (11 points each.) His approval rating among these white-collar whites reaches above 50% only in Texas and Georgia, and exceeds 45% in just two other states, Nevada and Arizona. In seven states, his approval among these well-educated white voters has tumbled to 40 percent or less. (That includes four states essential to his victory: North Carolina, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.)…
[Trump’s] standing [among working class whites] represents an erosion from his 2016 vote among blue-collar whites in 12 of those states; in five of them, he's declined by double-digits. Perhaps most important are the trends in four of the Rust Belt states that proved decisive last year: Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. In all of them exit polls found Trump won between 62 and 64% of non-college whites. In each case, that was a substantial increase from Romney's performance with those voters in 2012, when former President Barack Obama carried the states.
Strikingly, though, Trump's job approval among working-class whites in each of those states has now receded to match, or even slightly trail, the level of support they provided Romney when he lost the same states to Obama. In Wisconsin, for instance, Trump's approval among whites without a college degree now stands at 51%, close to Romney's 53% vote share in 2012 but far below Trump's own 62%. Likewise, in Pennsylvania, Trump is now at 55% approval with non-college whites, almost exactly Romney's 56% vote in 2012, but well below the president's 64% among them. 
 A fade to Romney levels of support in these states would be extremely problematic for the GOP. This is a trend to keep an eye on. 

Wednesday, August 9, 2017

Does It Make Any Sense To Be Anti-Globalization?


Does it make any sense to be anti-globalization, as many on the left style themselves? Brad DeLong doesn't think so and I'm inclined to agree (see chapter three of my book). DeLong terms such an attitude the new "socialism of fools" which perhaps goes a bit far. But he makes some excellent points in his new piece on Project Syndicate.

Stripped of associated theories, DeLong says globalization "should be understood as a process in which the world becomes increasingly interconnected through technological advances that drive down transportation and communication costs...To be sure, this form of globalization allows foreign producers to export goods and services to distant markets at a lower cost. But it also opens up export markets and reduces costs for the other side."

Put this way, globalization doesn't sound so bad and, importantly, sounds more or less inevitable. So why the intense reaction in many quarters against globalization? Why are people so upset at something that is arguably a natural outgrowth of economic and technological development?

Delong summarizes the reasons as follows:
First and foremost, it is easy for politicians to pin the blame for a country’s problems on foreigners and immigrants who do not vote.....
Second, more than a generation of inequitable and slower-than-expected economic growth in the global North has created a strong political and psychological need for scapegoats. People want a simple narrative to explain why they are missing out on the prosperity they were once promised, and why there is such a large and growing gap between an increasingly wealthy overclass and everyone else.
Third, China’s economic rise coincided with a period in which the global North was struggling to reach full employment. Contrary to what the followers of Friedrich von Hayek and Andrew Mellon have always claimed, economic readjustments do not happen when bankruptcies force labor and capital out of low-productivity, low-demand industries, but rather when booms pull labor and capital into high-productivity, high-demand industries.
Thus, neoliberalism does not just require open and competitive markets, global change, and price stability. It also depends on full employment and near-permanent booms, just as economist John Maynard Keynes had warned in the 1920s and 1930s. In recent decades, the neoliberal order failed to deliver either condition, most likely because doing so would have been impossible even with the best policies in place.
Fourth, policymakers did not do enough to compensate for this failure with more aggressive social policies and economic and geographic redistribution. When US President Donald Trump recently told upstate New Yorkers that they should leave the region and seek jobs elsewhere, he was simply echoing the past generation of center-right politicians in the global North.
The global North’s current political and economic dilemmas are not so different from those of the 1920s and 1930s. As Keynes noted then, the key is to produce and maintain full employment, at which point most other problems will melt away.
And, as the Austro-Hungarian economist Karl Polanyi argued, it is the role of government to secure socioeconomic rights. People believe that they have a right to live in healthy communities, hold stable occupations, and earn a decent income that rises over time.  
So there you go. The problem is not globalization but rather the constellation of economic policies that have kept us away from a high pressure full employment economy as globalization has proceeded. Blaming globalization is encouraging us to aim at the wrong target.

And, lest we forget, globalization has been central to the economic advances that have dramatically raised living standards all over the world. Indeed, most parts of the developing worldhave made huge progress in the last half century as globalization has bound countries closer and closer together.  Because of this, the proportion of the world’s population that lives on less than 2,200 calories a day has fallen from 56 percent in the mid-1960’s to less than 10 percent today. The proportion of the world’s population living in “extreme poverty” (currently defined by the World Bank as under $1.90 a day) has fallen from 44 percent in 1981 to less than 10 percent today. Put in terms of absolute numbers, there were almost 2 billion people living in extreme poverty in 1990; that is down to around 700 million today. That means around a quarter of the world’s population has been lifted out of extreme poverty in just the last 25 years—25 years that have coincided with an acceleration of globalization.

This trend has been strongest in East Asia, especially China, but it has greatly affected all parts of the developing world, including Sub-Saharan Africa, frequently the poster child for the alleged failures of globalization. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the percent of the population living in extreme poverty has dropped from 56 percent in 1990 to 35 percent today. More broadly, as Branko Milanovic, one of the world’s leading scholars on income distribution, notes:

Global income distribution [since the fall of the Berlin Wall] has changed in a remarkable way. It was probably the most profound global reshuffle of people’s economic positions since the Industrial Revolution. Broadly speaking the bottom third….became significantly better off and many of the people there escaped absolute poverty. The middle third or more became much richer, seeing their real incomes rise by approximately 3 per cent per capita annually.

Accompanying these dramatic rises in income have been dramatic increases in health. Between 1990 and 2013, the percentage of the world’s children who died before their fifth birthday fell by almost half. And overall life expectancy continues to climb, reaching 70 for those born in 2011. Back in 1950 world life expectancy was only 47. The average Mexican today lives longer than the average Briton did in 1955. And stunningly, of all the people in human history who have reached the age of 65, half are alive today.

These are amazing advances and they are taking place while the world is becoming ever more globalized. That’s because globalization, far from driving a race to the bottom, makes possible (even if it does not guarantee uniform progress in every country at every time) the spread of material progress to every corner of the earth. Marx, despite his underestimation of capitalism’s long-run potential, understood this. The broad left throughout most of the twentieth century understood this.  But many on today’s left have lost track of this fundamental truth and prefer instead to focus on the obvious facts that globalization has some negative effects, both in developing and advanced countries, and that material progress has been very uneven.  But it is only this maddening, uneven, unfair process that makes serious economic progress for most of human race possible. Therefore, on ethical and moral grounds alone, the left should enthusiastically embrace globalization, even as they seek to mitigate its negative effects where they occur and spread its benefits more evenly.

Tuesday, August 8, 2017

Is Trump's Base Really Shrinking?


While there are reasonable debates to be had about how much Trump's base is shrinking and how politically important such shrinkage might be, an accumulating mass of data indicates that Trump's base shrinkage is real. Consider:


Of course, it's a long way to election day and it is possible that Trump's ratings may improve by then (though his trend line is not good). And, even if Trump's approval ratings remain low, there are reasons why Democrats may have a hard time translating these low ratings into big gains. Finally, a Vox/SurveyMonkey aggregation of of six months of their polling data found that Trump's approval slippage has been relatively modest in Republican-held districts that were closest in the last election. Since these districts are critical targets for the Democrats in 2018, this finding, if confirmed by other polls, could indicate a potential problem for the Democrats.

So don't break out the champagne yet. But it's hard to see the very real and ongoing erosion of Trump's political base as anything other than good news.

Monday, August 7, 2017

Can't We and the Robots Just Be Friends?


Jared Bernstein is out with a great piece on his blog about whether robots will or will not steal all our jobs. He provides this super-short summary of the main strands in this argument:
Pro: Automation is killing jobs! The robots are coming!
Anti: Nuh-uh. If it were, productivity growth, or output per hour of work, would be climbing. Instead, it’s been slowing down…a lot.
Pro: Then we must be mis-measuring productivity growth.
Anti: Sorry, but solid evidence shows that’s not the case. Not to mention that thanks to years of job gains, we’re closing in on full employment.
Pro: Yeah, well, believe me. The robots are coming and the end of work is near!
Anti: Maybe. No one knows. But that claim has always been made and it has always been wrong.
As the summary implies, it is the "anti" side (no, robots won't take all our jobs) that is on firmer ground empirically and historically in this debate. That is exactly the case I made in a recent Vox article on the future of jobs. 

Bernstein develops a very important point in the remainder of his blog post that he summarizes as: "the robots are here, they’ve been here all along, and they’re not just substitutes that replace workers; they’re also complements that work with them." (emphasis added) He goes on to say:
In the earlier research, two analysts from Oxford University (Frey and Osborne) looked at the tasks done by workers in hundreds of US jobs, like number-crunching by accountants or selling clothes in retail outlets. They found that 47 percent of jobs had a high likelihood of being replaced by automation within a decade or two. Scary, right?
Except a deeper dive into those same weeds by couple of researchers from the OECD took that 47 percent down to 9 percent. The large fall off in the share of jobs threatened by automation was, the OECD authors argued, “driven by the fact that even in occupations that Frey and Osborne considered to be in the high risk [of automation] category, workers at least to some extent also perform tasks that are difficult to automate such as tasks involving face-to-face interaction.”…
In other words, the robot thing is not a zero-one situation, as in what you do at work is either totally automate-able or totally un-automate-able. For many workers, robots, AI, and other labor-saving technologies will be complementary to their work, boosting “throughput” in retail (“stack ‘em high and let ‘em fly”) and assembly-line work, efficiency in auto-maintenance, accuracy in accounting, etc., but not fully replacing human interactions. Moreover, this has been going on forever in one form or another as machines enter the workforce, and its one reason why productivity almost always–even now–increases year after year.
That leads me to be skeptical of “this time will be different” arguments in this space...
Unquestionably, the robots are going to keep coming. Some will replace jobs, some will create new sectors that add jobs, and some may even turn out to be, if not our besties, then at least helpful in improving the speed and quality of our output.
So stop panicking about the rise of the robots. As Rick Blaine says to Captain Renault at the end of Casablanca, this could "be the beginning of a beautiful friendship".

Sunday, August 6, 2017

If You Read Only One Lengthy, Dense Economic Report This Year....

It should be this one:


The report, by economist J.W. Mason for the Roosevelt Institute, is clearly written, closely argued, well documented and makes a compelling and very important case. The report is particularly good on the relationships between and among growth, productivity and the strength of demand. Here's perhaps the key argument:
While textbook theory suggests that productivity growth is a supply-side phenomenon, dependent on autonomous technological change and not on demand, we suggest that there are a number of reasons to expect strong demand to be associated with more rapid productivity gains, and weak demand to be associated with slower gains. There are a number of reasons to believe that weak demand has played a role in the exceptionally slow productivity growth of the past decade. First, the productivity slowdown has been spread out over a wide range of industries, including retail trade, services, transportation, durable and nondurable manufacturing, and other sectors. While the high-tech sectors that drove productivity gains in the 1990s have seen the largest falls in productivity growth, they account for only a relatively small portion of the overall slowdown. The breadth of the slowdown makes it hard to interpret in purely technological terms, or as simply the end of the exceptional productivity growth of the tech boom period. Second, the combination of slow productivity growth and slow employment growth is historically unusual; normally these two trends move in offsetting ways. A simultaneous decline in both is, historically, more typical of business-cycle recessions than of extended periods of slower growth.
Finally, the state of the economy as a whole is inconsistent with a story of tightening supply constraints. Macroeconomic theory—as well as history and common sense—strongly suggests an autonomous decline in the available labor force or that the pace of technological progress should be associated with higher inflation. The signature of a negative supply shock is lower output combined with higher prices. Normally, a central bank responds to a negative supply shock with contractionary policy—higher interest rates—in order to bring the level of spending in the economy down to the new, lower level of productive capacity. Yet the past decade has seen consistently low inflation even in the face of ultra-expansionary monetary policy—exactly the opposite of what we would expect from a fall in aggregate supply.
Given this picture, we think there is a strong case that slow growth is largely, if not entirely, a product of weak aggregate demand.
This is a very important analysis and I think largely correct. The most important implication is that there is nothing intrinsic or structural to recent sluggish economic performance. It is the refusal to attack weak demand with public investment, active fiscal policy and other measures that is to blame. Democrats take note.

Saturday, August 5, 2017

Science Fiction Saturday: The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction


Sadly, I think this resource is underutilized and underappreciated. The picture above is the cover of the second edition hardcover version of The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction, weighing in at a hefty 1,370 double column pages. My copy is lovingly dog-eared from use. As you might expect from a reference book published in 1993, it is out-of-print.

But never fear! The fabulous news is there is a third edition that is online, free and completely up-to-date. This resource is pretty incredible. There are over 17,000 separate entries, with 193,000 internal hyperlinks and an astonishing 5.4 million words of content. Entries cover every SF author you are ever likely to encounter along with key themes and subgenres within the field, SF art, SF TV and movies, SF magazines and websites and much more. If you can't find it here, you don't need to know it.

As a bonus the site has access to images of over 17,000 SF book covers (and who doesn't love SF book covers, the wilder the better?)